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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Thomas Campbell Kelley appeals from the district court's award of 
restitution for the costs of prosecution. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Kelley pied guilty to trafficking in marijuana, and his conviction was 
affirmed by the Idaho Court of Appeals in a prior appeal. State v. Kelley, 2015 
Opinion No. 76, Docket No. 42680 (Idaho App., Nov. 10, 2015) (copy attached 
for court's convenience). After Kelley's conviction the state sought restitution for 
the costs of prosecution in the amount of $7,330. (State's Exhibit 1 (seeking 
restitution for 10 hours of work by the prosecutor at $145 an hour and 42 hours of 
work at $140 per hour).) Kelley objected to the amount requested and claimed 
the statute, I.C. § 37-2732(k), unconstitutionally punished him for asserting his 
constitutional rights. (R., pp. 9-14.) The district court rejected the constitutional 
argument, but awarded substantially less than the state had requested, 
specifically $2,640. (R., pp. 19-27.) Kelley filed a notice of appeal from the 
order awarding restitution for the costs of prosecution. (R., pp. 28-30.) 
1 
ISSUES 
Kelley states the issues on appeal as: 
I. Is I.C. § 37-2372(k) [sic] unconstitutional? 
2. Did the district court err by failing to properly apply the legal 
standards as set forth in I.C. § 19-5304(7) with regard to the 
defendant's ability to pay? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3 (capitalization altered).) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Kelley failed to show that I.C. § 37-2732(k) is unconstitutional? 




Kelley Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That I.C. § 
37-2732(k) Is Constitutional 
A. Introduction 
The district court rejected Kelley's due process and equal protection 
arguments and concluded I.C. § 37-2732(k) is constitutional. (R., pp. 20-22.) 
Kelley's appellate arguments notwithstanding, application of relevant law shows 
the district court was correct. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the appellate court 
reviews it de nova. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 
(2003). The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute must overcome 
a strong presumption of constitutionality and clearly show the invalidity of the 
statute. kt The appellate court is obligated to seek a construction of a statute 
that upholds its constitutionality. kt 
C. I.C. § 37-2732(k) Does Not Violate Due Process 
"It is improper for a court to penalize a defendant merely because he or 
she exercises the right to put the government to its proof at trial." State v. Kellis, 
148 Idaho 812, 814, 229 P.3d 1174, 1176 (Ct. App. 2010). Courts that have 
considered the issue have rejected the claim that requiring a defendant to pay 
costs associated with trial penalizes a defendant for exercising his or her rights. 
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In United States v. Chavez, 627 F.2d 953, 953 (9th Cir. 1980), the 
government charged Chavez with willfully failing to file an income tax return. 
Chavez "filed a motion to dismiss the information on the grounds that the statute 
was unconstitutional" because the statute's "costs of prosecution provision was 
mandatory," and "chilled the exercise of his constitutional rights" - specifically, 
his rights to a jury trial, to confront witnesses, and to compulsory process. ~ at 
954-955. The Ninth Circuit, citing Supreme Court precedent, noted that it is 
"clearly established that not every burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, 
and not every pressure or encouragement to waive such a right, is invalid." ~ at 
956 (quoting Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218 (1978)). The court 
rejected Chavez's constitutional complaints, reasoning: 
In the instant case we find that any pressures upon the 
defendant to waive his constitutional rights that may exist on 
account of the costs of prosecution provision are not such as to 
compel this court to find the Congressional scheme 
unconstitutional. A defendant, prosecuted for willful failure to file a 
tax return, is not subject to a substantial risk of greater punishment 
because of the existence of the costs of prosecution provision. The 
provision does serve legitimate governmental purposes. We 
cannot say with any confidence that the costs of prosecution 
provision of [the statute] does in fact penalize a defendant's 
exercise of his constitutional rights. [The statute] provides for a 
punishment of not more than $10,000.00, or more than one year 
imprisonment, or both. Any sentence that would be imposed upon 
conviction, within those bounds, would be within the ordinary 
discretion of the trial judge. The presence of the mandatory costs 
of prosecution provision does not, with any degree of certainty, 
substantially increase the threatened punishment. Any 
encouragement of the waiver of constitutional rights that this 
provision may induce is substantially different from the pressures 
that undeniably existed in [United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 
(1968)], and cannot be said to be an impermissible burden upon 
the exercise of constitutional rights. In light of the fact that the 
provision does serve legitimate government purposes, we cannot 
say that it needlessly encourages the waiver of constitutional rights. 
4 
Chavez, 627 F.2d at 956-957. 
Kelley, like the defendant in Chavez, also relies on Jackson in support of 
his argument. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6, 9.) Jackson, however, does not support 
Kelley's constitutional claim. At issue in Jackson was a federal statute that, in 
the Court's words, provided: "in an interstate kidnaping case where the victim 
has not been liberated unharmed, the defendant's assertion of the right to jury 
trial may cost him his life, for the federal statute authorizes the jury-and only the 
jury-to return a verdict of death." Jackson, 390 U.S. at 572. In other words, the 
death penalty was "applicable only to those defendants who assert the right to 
contest their guilt before a jury." kt at 581. The Supreme Court held this was 
unconstitutional because it impermissibly chilled the exercise of a constitutional 
right. kt at 581-582. 
Unlike the selective death penalty provision at issue in Jackson, Idaho 
Code § 37-2732(k) does not impermissibly chill a defendant's right to a jury trial. 
The statute provides, in relevant part: 
Upon conviction of a felony or misdemeanor violation under 
this chapter ... , the court may order restitution for costs incurred 
by law enforcement agencies in investigating the violation. Law 
enforcement agencies shall include, but not be limited to, the Idaho 
state police, county and city law enforcement agencies, the office of 
the attorney general and county and city prosecuting attorney 
offices. Costs shall include, but not be limited to, those incurred for 
the purchase of evidence, travel and per diem for law enforcement 
officers and witnesses throughout the course of the investigation, 
hearings and trials, and any other investigative or prosecution 
expenses actually incurred, including regular salaries of employees. 
1.C. § 37-2732(k). 
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The restitution award authorized by LC.§ 37-2732(k) is not premised upon 
whether the defendant exercises his right to a jury trial. That costs may be more, 
and therefore the restitution award greater, if the defendant proceeds to trial does 
not mean the statute impermissibly chills the exercise of the right to a jury trial. 
To conclude otherwise would effectively negate the ability to offer reduced 
charges in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea - a practice that is clearly 
constitutionally sound. See Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 802 (1989) 
(citations omitted) ("we have upheld the prosecutorial practice of threatening a 
defendant with increased charges if he does not plead guilty, and following 
through on that threat if the defendant insists on his right to stand trial" and "we 
have recognized that the same mutual interests that support the practice of plea 
bargaining to avoid trial may also be pursued directly by providing for a more 
lenient sentence if the defendant pleads guilty"). 
Kelley's reliance on Jackson also ignores that subsequent Supreme Court 
cases have "not enthusiastically embraced the 'chill' rationale articulated in 
Jackson." Chavez, 627 F.2d at 956. In relation to Kelley's constitutional 
challenge, the most notable post-Jackson Supreme Court case is Fuller v. 
Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974). In Fuller, the Court considered "whether Oregon 
may constitutionally require a person convicted of a criminal offense to repay to 
the State the costs of providing him with effective representation of counsel, 
when he is indigent at the time of the criminal proceedings but subsequently 
acquires the means to bear the costs of his legal defense." 417 U.S. at 41. 
Among Fuller's constitutional arguments was his claim that the reimbursement 
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provision of the challenged statute "might impel him to decline the services of an 
appointed attorney and thus 'chill' his constitutional right to counsel." kl at 51. 
The Court rejected this argument because "[t]he fact that an indigent who 
accepts state-appointed legal representation knows that he might someday be 
required to repay the costs of these services in no way effects his eligibility to 
obtain counsel." kl at 53. Similarly, the fact that a defendant who exercises his 
right to trial may have to pay greater restitution costs "in no way effects" his 
ability to exercise her constitutional rights. 
Consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Fuller, and the Ninth 
Circuit's opinion in Chavez, several state courts have rejected claims that awards 
for prosecution costs are unconstitutional. See, M.:., Ohree v. Commonwealth, 
494 S.E.2d 484, 488 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) ("the imposition of the cost of providing 
a jury does not impose an excessive or unnecessary burden upon the exercise of 
the right of a jury trial under the United States Constitution"); State v. Albert, 899 
P.2d 103, 116 (Alaska 1995) (state criminal rule authorizing judgment for 
payment for services of representation "does not conflict with the right to counsel 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution" or the 
state constitution); Commonwealth v. Hower, 406 A.2d 754, 757 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1979) (although "the possibility that a convicted defendant may be required to 
pay the costs of prosecution may impose some burden on a particular 
defendant's choice of whether to go to trial or plead guilty and thereby avoid the 
costs," "not every burden imposed by the state on a defendant's right to trial is 
constitutionally prohibited"). 
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Kelley has failed to meet his burden of establishing that I.C. § 37-2732(k) 
is an unconstitutional punishment for exercise of a constitutional right 
D. I.C. § 37-2732(k) Does Not Violate Equal Protection 
"The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands 
that no State shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equai protection 
of the laws,' which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated 
should be treated alike."' State v. Hamlin, 156 Idaho 307, 316, 324 P.3d 1006, 
1015 (Ct. App. 2014) (quoting City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 
U.S. 432, 439 (1985)). "'Equal protection issues focus on classifications within 
statutory schemes that allocate benefits or burdens differently among the 
categories of persons affected."' Hamlin, 156 Idaho at 316, 324 P.3 at 1015 
(quoting In re Bermudes, 141 Idaho 157, 160, 106 P.3d 1123, 1126 (2005)). 
When evaluating a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, this Court engages 
in a three-step analysis: first, the Court must "identify the classification that is 
being challenged;" second, the Court "determine[s] the standard under which the 
classification will be judicially reviewed;" and third, the Court must "decide 
whether the appropriate standard has been satisfied." kl "Therefore, in order for 
[Kelley] to prevail [on his Equal Protection claim,] he would be required to show 
that he, by virtue of some classification, is being treated differently than a person 
who does not share that classification." Hamlin, 156 Idaho at 316, 324 P.3d at 
1015. Kelley's claim fails on the first step of the analysis. 
Kelley asserts that his indigence is the classification at issue here. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 7-9.) His argument, however, is that the statute violates 
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equal protection because it does not treat indigent defendants differently. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 8-9 (the statute "does not apply only to those Defendants 
who become able to pay").) Kelley's insistence he must be treated differently for 
his indigence is essentially an anti-equal protection claim. 1 The district court did 
not err by rejecting this argument. Kelley has failed to show that I.C. § 37-
2732(k) is unconstitutional. 
11. 
Kelley Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
A Introduction 
The district court considered the relevant factors (R., p. 22), reduced the 
number of hours of work for which it was awarding restitution based on Kelley's 
objection (R., pp. 22-24), found the state's request for reimbursement for the 
restitution hearing itself reasonable (R., p. 24), and, again based on Kelley's 
objection, reduced the hourly rate for reimbursement to $75 an hour (R., p. 24). 
On appeal Kelley argues the court abused its discretion because it "did not apply 
the standards set out in I.C. § 19-5304(7)." (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-12.) 
Kelley's argument is frivolous. 
1 Kelley's anti-equal protection claim is based on a misreading of two cases. In 
James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972), the Court held that it violated equal 
protection to strip those owing public defender reimbursement of protections 
afforded other civil debtors, and in Rinaldo v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966), the 
Court held it violated equal protection to impose certain costs of appeal on 
appellants who were incarcerated while not imposing them on appellants who 
were not incarcerated. Neither of these cases stands for the proposition that it 
violates equal protection to "burden an individual with a debt he cannot pay." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 8.) 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"The decision regarding whether to order restitution, and in what amount, 
is within the district court's discretion," guided by factors in Idaho Code section 
19-5304(7). State v. Hurles, 158 Idaho 569, 573, 349 P.3d 423, 427 (2015) 
(citing State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011)). "The 
determination of the amount of restitution is a question of fact for the trial court 
whose findings will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence." kl 
(citing State v. Lombard, 149 Idaho 819, 822, 242 P.3d 189, 192 (Ct. App. 
201 O)); see also State v. Cardoza, 155 Idaho 889, 895, 318 P.3d 658, 664 (Ct. 
App. 2014) (district court has discretion to determine the amount of restitution for 
prosecution costs). 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion 
The district court properly awarded the state restitution for costs incurred 
in prosecuting Kelley. "Restitution may be ordered by the district court under I.C. 
§ 37-2732(k) once a defendant is convicted of, or pleads guilty to, a crime under 
the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, Title 37, Chapter 27 of the Idaho Code." 
State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167, 169, 345 P.3d 226, 228 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing 
State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 257-58, 281 P.3d 90, 94-95 (2012)). Idaho 
Code section 37-2732(k) provides in pertinent part: 
(k) Upon conviction of a felony or misdemeanor violation under this 
chapter ... the court may order restitution for costs incurred by law 
enforcement agencies in investigating the violation. Law 
enforcement agencies shall include, but not be limited to... the 
office of the attorney general and county and city prosecuting 
attorney offices. Costs shall include, but not be limited to, those 
incurred for the purchase of evidence, travel and per diem for law 
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enforcement officers and witnesses throughout the course of the 
investigation, hearings and trials, and any other investigative or 
prosecution expenses actually incurred, including regular salaries 
of employees. 
I.C. § 37-2732(k). This code section does not provide specific guidance on the 
nature of a restitution award or procedure so the Court follows the general 
restitution statute. Weaver, 158 Idaho at 170, 345 P.3d at 229. The general 
policy favors full compensation to crime victims who suffer economic loss. kl 
(citing State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37, 43 P.3d 794, 796 (Ct. App. 2002); 
State v. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541, 543, 768 P.2d 804, 806 (Ct. App. 1989)). 
An order of restitution will not be overturned unless the district court 
abused its discretion. kl "When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed 
on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) 
whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; 
and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." 
lit (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)). 
"To meet the second and third requirements of this analysis, the trial court must 
base the amount of restitution upon the preponderance of evidence submitted by 
the prosecutor, defendant, victim, or presentence investigator." lit (citing I.C. § 
19-5304(6)). The amount of restitution is a question of fact for the trial court and 
the trial court's findings of fact will not be disturbed if supported by substantial 
evidence. Id. "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
11 
mind might accept to support a conclusion." kt (citing State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 
882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013)). 
In Weaver, the district court granted the state's request for restitution for 
prosecution costs under Idaho Code § 37-2732(k). kt The state submitted a 
written estimated accounting of the time spent prosecuting Weaver. kt This 
amount of time was multiplied by a rate of $75 an hour. kt The district court 
determined that $75 an hour was reasonable within the legal community, and 
Weaver did not challenge that determination on appeal. kt at 170 n.1, 345 P. 3d 
at 229 n. 1. The accounting was signed by the prosecutor assigned to Weaver's 
case. kt at 170, 345 P.3d at 229. Weaver challenged the prosecutor's 
calculation of time, arguing that the prosecutor only spent 30 seconds for the 
initial appearance but the written accounting listed 12 minutes. kt The Idaho 
Court of Appeals affirmed the restitution order holding that even an estimate 
"constitutes substantial evidence to support the district court's award." kt The 
Court noted that Weaver did not present any evidence to undermine or contradict 
the state's calculation of the restitution amount. kt at 171, 345 P.3d at 230. 
The state presented evidence of $7,330 reimbursable costs of 
prosecution. (State's Exhibit 1.) The district court, in an exercise of discretion, 
reduced both the hours worked and the hourly rate and awarded only $2,640. 
(R., pp. 22-24.) On appeal Kelley argues the court abused its discretion because 
it "did not apply the standards set out in I.C. § 19-5304(7)." (Appellant's brief, p. 
11.) The district court specifically stated it "considered the factors set forth in I .C. 
12 
§ 19-5304(7)." (R., p. 22.) Kelley's appellate argument is frivolous. Kelley has 
failed to show any abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the award of restitution 
for costs of prosecution. 
DATED this 29th day of Decembe 
1 
2015. 
KENNETH K. JORG 
Deputy Attorney Gen 
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MELANSON, Chief Judge 
Thomas Campbell Kelley appeals from his judgment of conviction for trafficking in 
marijuana. Specifically, Kelley argues that the search of his vehicle ,.vas invalid and the district 
court erred in denying his motion to suppress. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
Oregon State Police infonned the Idaho State Police that Kelley had been stopped in 
Oregon. The Oregon officer advised that his encounter with Kelley aroused suspicion of drug 
activity, but no drug dog was available for a search. Kelley did not consent to a search of the 
vehicle and 'vvas allowed to continue on his way. An Idaho officer observed and stopped Kelley 
after he changed lanes on Interstate 84 (I-84) without signaling for at least five continuous 
seconds in violation of I.C. § 49-808(2). 
During the stop, Kelley provided a driver's license and car registration from different 
states. The car was owned by a third patty and Kelley was unable to provide proof of insurance. 
The officer conducted follow-up inquiries about the car's owner, the insurance, and Kelley's trip 
plans. During this discussion, Kelley provided false information about his encounter with 
Oregon police and details about his trip from the Lake Tahoe area to Jackson Hole, Wyoming. 
These topics were revisited throughout the encounter. The officer noted Kelley's bloodshot eyes 
and conducted a test, which revealed that Kelley had eyelid tremors consistent with recent 
marijuana use. Approximately eight minutes into the stop, a drug dog performed a perimeter 
sniff of Kelley's vehicle and alerted to the front driver and passenger doors and open windows. 
Once inside the vehicle, the dog promptly entered the backseat, which was partially folded down 
and open to the trunk compai1ment. The dog alerted to areas between and under the backseat 
cushions toward the rear of the vehicle. In a subsequent search of the trunk, three vacuum-sealed 
containers of marijuana were found. 
Kelley was charged with trafficking in marijuana. J.C. § 37-2732B(a)(l). He filed a 
motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his vehicle. Specifically, Kelley 
argued that the stop was invalid because LC. § 49-808(2) is void for vagueness and because the 
officer did not have reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of the traffic stop. Additionally, 
Kelley argued that the officers did not have probable cause to search the vehicle's trunk area. 
The district court denied the motion. Kelley entered a conditional guilty plea to trafficking in 
marijuana, preserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress. Kelley appeals. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. \\Then a decision on a 
motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by 
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts 
as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a 
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, 
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Scheve,·s, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 




A. Void for Vagueness 
Kelley argues that LC. § 49-808(2) is void for vagueness as applied to his conduct. 
Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, we review the lower court's decision 
de novo. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998); State v. Martin, 148 
Idaho 3 I, 34, 218 P .3d 10, 13 (Ct. App. 2009). The party attacking a statute on constitutional 
grounds bears the burden of proof and must overcome a strong presumption of validity. State v. 
Freitas, 157 Idaho 257,261,335 P.3d 597,601 (Ct. App. 2014); State v. Cook, 146 Idaho 261, 
262, 192 P.3d 1085, 1086 (Ct. App. 2008). Appellate courts are obligated to seek an 
interpretation of a statute that upholds its constitutionality. Freitas, 157 Idaho at 261, 335 P .3d 
at 601; 1\;fartin, 148 Idaho at 34, 218 P .3d at 13. 
Due process requires that all be informed as to what the state commands or forbids and 
that persons of ordinary intelligence not be forced to guess at the meaning of the law. Cobb, 132 
Idaho at 197, 969 P.2d at 246. No one may be required at the peril of loss of liberty to speculate 
as to the meaning of penal statutes. Freitas, 157 Idaho at 261, 335 P.3d at 601. A void for 
vagueness challenge is more favorably acknowledged and a more stringent vagueness test will be 
applied where a statute imposes a criminal penalty. Cobb, 132 Idaho at 198, 969 P.2d at 247. As 
a result, criminal statutes must plainly and unmistakably provide fair notice of what is prohibited 
and what is allowed in language persons of ordinary intelligence will understand. State v. 
Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 486, 80 P.3d l 083, I 087 (2003). Additionally, a statute is void for 
vagueness if it invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Freitas, 157 Idaho at 261, 335 
P.3d at 601. A statute avoids problems with arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by 
identifying a core of circumstances to which the statute or ordinance unquestionably could be 
constitutionally applied. Id A statute should not be held void for uncertainty if it can be given 
any practical interpretation. Id. at 262, 335 P.3d at 602. 
A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to a 
defendant's conduct. Freitas, 157 Idaho at 262, 335 P.3d at 602; Marlin, 148 Idaho at 35, 218 
P .3d at 14. Here, Kelley does not make a facial challenge, but contends only that the statute is 
impermissibly vague as applied to him. To succeed on an as-applied vagueness challenge, a 
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defendant must show that the statute failed to provide fair notice that the defendant's conduct 
was prohibited or failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that police had unbridled discretion 
in determining whethet· to arrest the defendant. State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906,915,265 P.3d 
519, 528 (Ct. App. 2011 ). 
In this case, the officer stopped Kelley for failing to signal his lane change for at least 
five continuous seconds on a controlled access highway in violation of LC. § 49-808(2). Idaho 
Code Section 49-808 governs the use of turn signals on Idaho roadways and provides, in 
pertinent prut: 
(2) A signal of intention to tum or move right or left when required 
shall be given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways 
and before turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given continuously 
for not less than five (5) seconds and, in all other instances, for not less than the 
last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Kelley argues that I.C. § 49-808(2) fails to provide fair notice of the signaling 
requirements when traveling along I-84. Under his interpretation of the statute, it is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied here because the nature of I-84 invokes both the 
"controlled-access highway" and the "in all other instances" signal requirements. Specifically, 
he argues that 1-84 qualifies as a controlled-access highway subjecting him to the five-second 
signaling rule and also as a "through highway" falling under the all other instances requirement 
to signal for not less than the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. Under this 
construction, Kelley contends that a person of ordinary intelligence would be unable to 
distinguish between the two types of highways and consequently renders the person unable to 
discern what is required under the statute. 
This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes. State 
v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003). Where the language of a 
statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without 
engaging in statutory construction. State l'. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 
(1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000). The language of 
the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning, Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 
978 P.2d at 219. If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the com1 to 
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resort to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 PJd 
at 67. 
This Court recently interpreted the plain meaning of I.C. § 49-808(2) in State v. Brooks, 
157 Idaho 890, 341 P.3d 1259 (Ct. App. 2014). There, we held that, because Brooks was 
traveling on a controlled-access highway, he was required to signal for at least five continuous 
seconds prior to moving out of his lane into another. Id. at 892, 894, 341 P.3d at 1261, 1263. 
Because Brooks had failed to signal for five continuous seconds before changing lanes, he 
violated I.C. § 49-808(2) and provided the officer reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. 
Id. at 894, 341 P.3d at 1263. In interpreting the statute, this Court held that LC.§ 49-808(2) 
requires that a vehicle signal for at least five continuous seconds when traveling on a 
controlled-access highway and when turning from a parked position (regardless of the type of 
roadway on which the vehicle is parked). Brooks, 157 Idaho at 894,341 P.3d at 1263. We held 
that in all other circumstances, a vehicle must signal for at least the last 100 feet traveled before 
turning. Id. 
Under the plain language of the statute, when a highway meets the definition of a 
controlled-access highway under I.C. § 49-109(5)(b), a driver is required to abide by the 
signaling requirements of controlled-access highways. Kelley concedes that I-84 qualifies as a 
controlled-access higll\vay. Kelley argues that the statute is vague because in addition to being a 
controlled access highway, I-84 may be considered a through highway as defined in I.C. 
§ 49-109(5)(c). Kelley cites the testimony of an Idaho Department of Transportation official 
who was called as a witness by the state. On direct examination, the official testified that I-84 is 
a limited access highway. 1 On cross-examination, he testified that he was not aware of any 
statutory definition of "through highway." Defense counsel then asked the official whether 
traffic on I-84 "is given preferential right-of-way at the entrances to which other vehicles try to 
come onto the highway." He responded that, according to his understanding of the traffic laws, 
that was true. However, in full, LC. § 49-109(5)(c) defines a through highway as "[a]ny 
highway or portion of it on which vehicular traffic is given preferential right-of-way, and at the 
entrances to which vehicular traffic from intersecting highways is required by law to yield the 
It is apparent from the testimony that limited access and controlled access are used 
interchangeably. 
5 
right-of-way to vehicles on the through highway in obedience to a stop sign, yield sign, or other 
traffic-control device." (Emphasis added.) Notably, the italicized portion of the definition was 
omitted from defense counsel's question and is omitted from Kelley's brief on appeal. Kelley 
relies solely upon the testimony of the official to show that LC. § 49-808(2) is vague. He has not 
met his burden. Furthermore, as we noted in Brook<;, an interpretation of I.C. § 49-808(2) which 
would require signaling a Jane change for not less than 100 feet would mean that the driver of a 
vehicle traveling at the speed limit would need to signal for less than one second before changing 
lanes. This interpretation of the statute would be inconsistent with the clearly expressed 
legislative intent of ensuring driver safety by requiring signals that are appropriate for the 
attendant circumstances. Brook<;, 157 Idaho at 894, 341 P.3d at 1263. Applying the same 
reasoning to Kelley's argument, we note that the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that all be 
informed as to what the state commands or forbids and that persons of common intelligence not 
be forced to guess at the meaning of the criminal law. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 
(1974); State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 (l 998). Surely, no person of 
ordinary intelligence would reasonably believe that LC. § 49-808(2) requires a driver on I-84 to 
signal for less than one second before changing lanes. 
Because I-84 is a controlled-access highway, Kelley was required to signal continuously 
for five seconds prior to moving right or left in order to warn other motorists. See Brooks, 157 
Idaho at 894, 341 P.3d at 1263 (interpreting I.C. § 49-808(2)). Because a plain reading of the 
statute delineates the signaling requirements of motorists traveling on a controlled-access 
highway, it provides adequate notice. We hold that J.C. § 49-808(2) is neither ambiguous nor 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Kelley's conduct. 
B. Reasonable Suspicion to Extend Stop 
Kelley challenges the district comi's conclusion that the officer did not umeasonably 
extend the length or scope of the traffic stop to allow for a drug investigation and the drug dog 
search. A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and 
implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against umeasonable searches and seizures. 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,653 (1979); State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 
1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to 
investigate possible criminal behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the 
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vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 
(1981); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 1998). The 
reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the 
time of the stop. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474,483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999). The 
reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause but more than mere speculation 
or instinct on the part of the officer. Id. An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the 
facts in his or her possession, and those inferences may be drawn from the officer's experience 
and law enforcement training. State v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319, 321, 756 P.2d 1083, l 085 (Ct. 
App. 1988). 
Investigative detentions must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop. State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926,931 (Ct. App. 2004); 
State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 651, 51 P.3d 461, 465 (Ct. App. 2002). The scope of the 
intrusion permitted will vary to some extent with the particular facts and circumstances of each 
case. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.3d at 931; State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357,361, 17 P.3d 
301, 305 (Ct. App. 2000). 
The investigation following a stop generally must be reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P .3d at 
931; Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 361, 17 P.3d at 305. Suspicious circumstances may arise out ofa 
routine traffic stop that could justify an officer asking fiuther questions unrelated to the stop. 
State v. ivfyers, 118 Idaho 608, 613, 798 P .2d 453, 458 (Ct. App. 1990). Thus, brief inquiries not 
otherwise related to the initial purpose of the stop do not necessarily violate a detainee's Fourth 
Amendment rights. Roe, 140 Idaho at 18 l, 90 P.3d at 931. The officer's observations, general 
inquiries, and events succeeding the stop may--and often do--give rise to legitimate reasons for 
particularized lines of inquiry and forther investigation. Id. Accordingly, the length and scope 
of an investigatory detention may be lawfully expanded if there exist objective and specific 
articulable facts that justify suspicion of criminal activity in addition to that which prompted the 
detention. Id. 
A drug dog sniff may be performed during a traffic stop without violating the Fourth 
Amendment if the duration of the stop is not extended or if any extension of the stop is justified 
by reasonable suspicion. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (use of a well-trained 
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narcotics-detection dog during a lawful traffic stop does not rise to the level of a constitutionally 
cognizable infringement); State v. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 890, l 87 P.3d 1261, 1265 (Ct. App. 
2008) (stop was not extended to allow a drug dog sniff); Stale v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 917, 
42 P.3d 706,710 (Ct. App. 2001) (extending the stop to allow for a drng dog sniff was justified). 
When gauging whether information known to an officer justified reasonable suspicion, 
we consider the totality of the circumstances rather than viewing individual facts in isolation. 
Roe, 140 Idaho at 180, 90 P .3d at 930. Even where any individual factor "is not by itself proof 
of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent" conduct, a court may nonetheless 
conclude that the factors amount to reasonable suspicion when taken together. United States v. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1989). In other words, the whole may be greater than the sum of its 
parts because the officer may consider the import of one fact in light of another fact. 
In this case, prior to the Idaho officer's encounter with Kelley, he received information 
about Kelley's earlier encounter with Oregon police. During that stop, Kelley was suspected of 
drug activity, but the Oregon officer let Kelley proceed because no drng dog was available and 
Kelley refused consent to search the vehicle. The Idaho officer observed Kelley commit a traffic 
infraction at 12: 19:46 a.m. and initiated a traffic stop. Kelley produced a driver's license and car 
registration naming a third party owner but failed to provide proof of insurance. During the 
follow-up discussion about the registration and insurance, at 12:20:26 a.m., Kelley volunteered 
information about the Oregon stop, which the officer knew to be false. At 12:20:53 a.m., Kelley 
refe1Ted to details about his travel plans from the Lake Tahoe area to Jackson Hole, Wyoming. 
The officer made further inquiry about the owner of the vehicle, to which Kelley volunteered 
additional information about his living atTaignments in the Lake Tahoe area. At 12:21 :49 a.m. 
the officer once again asked about insurance and Kelley was still unable to produce proof of 
coverage. During the conversation with Kelley, the officer observed also that Kelley's eyes were 
bloodshot. 
The district court held that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the office1· had 
reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of the stop beyond the initial purpose of a traffic 
violation to allow for a drug dog search. The district court found that the officer was trained and 
experienced to identify indicators of drug trafficking and of marijuana use. The district court 
noted that the officer, based on his training and experience, regarded Kelley's travel plans as 
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confusing and suspicious because he was making a quick back and forth trip, with little luggage, 
in a third-party-owned vehicle from the Lake Tahoe area to Jackson Hole, Wyoming, via central 
Oregon, which was not the most direct route. The district court also noted that the officer had 
knowledge about the details concerning Kelley's encounter with the Oregon police and thus, the 
officer knew that Kelley's statements about that stop were false, thereby raising further suspicion 
that there may be narcotics in the vehicle. The district court finally noted the officer's 
observation that Kelley had bloodshot eyes, later prompting the officer to perform an eye tremor 
test which positively indicated recent marijuana use. Accordingly, the district court held that the 
officer possessed reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop to investigate possible narcotics 
activity and allow for a drug dog search. Given the officer's training and the information 
previously provided by the Oregon police, the officer's suspicion that Kelley may be involved in 
drug activity was reasonable based on the factors identified by the district court. Therefore, we 
hold that the officer possessed reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of the stop beyond the 
initial purpose of a traffic violation to allow for a drug investigation and the subsequent drug dog 
search. 
On appeal, Kelley does not appear to argue that the officer's inferences drawn from 
Kelley's misrepresentations about the Oregon stop and his travel plans were unreasonable per se. 
Rather, Kelley argues that this information did not arise until after the purpose of the stop had 
ended or was impermissibly abandoned. Kelley contends this occuned after the officer last 
mentioned the proof of insurance at 12:22:25 a.m., less than four minutes into the stop. Recently 
the United States Supreme Court held that authority to detain a motorist ends when tasks tied to 
the traffic infraction are completed or reasonably should have been completed. Rodriguez v. 
United States, _ U.S. _, _, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614-15 (2015). Kelley has not 
demonstrated, beyond a mere assertion, that within those first four minutes of the stop the officer 
could or should have been able to nm Kelley's information and issue a warning or citation.2 The 
2 To support his argument that the purpose of the stop had ended before the suspicious 
information arose, Kelley analogizes his case to State v. Gutierrez, 13 7 Idaho 64 7, 51 P .3d 461 
(Ct. App. 2002) (holding that it was impe11nissible for an officer to question a driver about 
matters unrelated to the traffic stop after the officer had fulfilled the purpose of the stop by 
issuing a written warning to the driver). Kelley asks this Court to conclude that, because the 
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officer had not yet returned to his police car to run Kelley's information, nor did he make any 
indication about giving a warning for either the traffic violation or failure to provide proof of 
insurance. Contrary to Kelley's assertions, the record does not show that the purpose of the stop 
had ended at the time the officer last mentioned the issue of insurance. 
Next, Kelley relies on State v. Aguhn, 141 Idaho 560, 112 P .3d 848 (Ct. App. 2005) to 
support the proposition that, even if the purpose of the stop had not concluded, his detention 
became illegal because the officer abandoned the traffic violation investigation at 12:22:25 a.m. 
and began a drug investigation without reasonable suspicion to detain him on that basis. In 
Aguirre, officers stopped Aguirre for failing to stop when entering the roadway. By the time 
officers stopped Aguirre, they had checked for warrants and were given other pertinent 
information from dispatch. Upon informing Aguirre of the purpose of the stop, the officers 
obtained Aguirre's license and registration. However, instead of pursuing the issuance of the 
citation, the officer asked if anything illegal was in the vehicle and asked for consent to search. 
When denied consent, the officer employed a drug dog around the vehicle. Though other 
officers were at the scene, none of the officers continued the initial purpose of the stop; rather, 
the officers all pursued the drug investigation. This Court noted that the "purpose that justified 
the stop--the issuance of a traffic citation--was immediately abandoned." Id. at 564, 112 P.3d at 
852. We therefore held that the use of the drug dog impermissibly extended the duration of the 
detention. Id. 
Kelley's reliance on Aguirre is misplaced. In Aguirre, the officers abandoned the 
investigation into the traffic offense to pursue a drug investigation that was not supported by 
reasonable suspicion. Here, the officer had sufficient infonnation that gave rise to the officer's 
officer did not immediately issue a citation or warning for the traffic violation or the failure to 
provide proof of insurance, the purpose of the stop ended at the last mention of insurance. 
However, GU!ierrez is inapposite to Kelley's case. In Gutierrez, the purpose of the stop 
had ended when the officer cond1..1cted a records check, found nothing, and then issued the 
warning citation before further detention to allow for the improper drug investigation. Unlike 
the officer in Gutierrez, the officer here had not yet returned to his police car to run Kelley's 
information, nor did he make any indication about giving a warning for either the traffic 
violation or failure to provide proof of insurance. Rather, the record shows that the officer was 
still pursuing reasonable inquires as the encounter with Kelley progressed. 
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suspicions before the 12:22:25 a.m. time that Kelley contends that the stop was impermissibly 
extended. As we have already explained above, the record sho\vs that Kelley had lied about the 
Oregon stop (12:20:26 a.m.) and given confusing travel plans (12:20:53 a.m.) before the time 
that Kelley contends the purpose of the stop was abandoned. Additionally, during their 
conversation the officer was observing Kelley and would have noted Kelley's bloodshot eyes. 
This sequence of events belies Kelley's argument. Although, the district court did not 
specifically address the chronology of its findings, after an independent review of the record, we 
conclude that Kelley's misinformation, confusing travel plans, and bloodshot eyes provided the 
officer reasonable suspicion that Kelley may have been involved in drug-related activity before 
12:22:25 a.m. Therefore, the officer was justified in extending the stop beyond the last mention 
of the proof of insurance at 12:22:25 a.m. 
Moreover follov,>ing the last mention of insurance, the officer had reasonable suspicion to 
continue Kelley's detention allowing for the drug dog search. Immediately following the 
officer's last question about insurance, the officer conducted an eye tremor test which indicated 
that Kelley had recently used marijuana. The officer inquired into Kelley's marijuana use and 
whether there was marijuana in the vehicle. The officer asked for consent to search the vehicle. 
Kelley refused but again volunteered false information about the Oregon stop. Thereafter, while 
Kelley and the officer further discussed Kelley's travel plan details, Kelley was asked to step out 
of the vehicle, at which time empty beer cans were discovered. Within eight minutes of the 
beginning of the stop, the drug dog commenced the exterior sniff search and subsequently alerted 
to an odor of a controlled substance. We conclude that, while the original purpose of the stop 
was for a traffic infraction, the purpose of the stop reasonably extended into a dmg investigation 
as the encounter with Kelley progressed. Therefore, based on a review of the totality of the 
circumstances, Kelley has failed to show that the district court erred in finding that the officer 
possessed reasonable suspicion sufficient to allow for the drug dog search. 
C. Probable Cause to Search the Trunk 
Kelley argues that the district court erred in finding that there was sufficient probable 
cause to search the trunk of the vehicle without a warrant. The Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution prohibits umeasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless searches are 
presumed to be umeasonable and therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Weave!\ 
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127 Idaho 288, 290, 900 P .2d 196, 198 (1995). The state may overcome this presumption by 
demonstrating that a warrantless search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the 
warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable unde1· the circumstances. Id One such 
exception is the automobile exception, under which police officers may search an automobile 
and the containers within it when they have probable cause to believe that the automobile 
contains contraband or evidence of a crime. Carroll v. United States, 261 U.S. 132, 153 (1925); 
State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 898, 821 P.2d 949, 953 (1991). The permissible scope of a 
warrnntless automobile search "is defined by the object of the search and the places in which 
there is probable cause to believe it will be found." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 
( 1982). Probable cause is a flexible, common sense standard. A practical, nontechnical 
probability that incriminating evidence is present is all that is required. Texas v. Brown, 460 
U.S. 730, 742 (1983); State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 61,266 P.3d 1161, 1166 (Ct. App. 2011). 
When a reliable drug dog indicates that a lawfully stopped automobile contains the odo1· of a 
controlled substance, the officer has probable cause to believe that there are drugs in the 
automobile and may search it without a warrant. Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 898, 821 P.2d at 953; 
State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 281, 108 P .3d 424, 428 (Ct. App. 2005). The United States 
Supreme Comt has held that probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal 
activity authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found. 
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332,347 (2009); Ross, 456 U.S. at 820-21. 
The district court held that the officer had probable cause to search the vehicle's 
passenger and trunk compartments. Kelley does not contest that there was probable cause to 
search the passenger compartment of the vehicle given the drng dog's detection of a controlled 
substance odor at both the front driver and passenger doors. He instead argues that the drug 
dog's alert did not provide probable cause to search the trnnk. Specifically, his argument is 
premised on the assertion that the officer's search of the trunk occurred simultaneously with the 
placement of the dog into the vehicle and, consequently, probable cause could not have been 
established to search the trunk area itself at the time of the search. Kelley contends that State v. 
Schmadeka, 136 Idaho 595, 38 P.3d 633 (Ct. App. 2001) supports this argument. 
In Schmadeka, the search \'Vas not predicated upon a drug dog's alert. Rather, a police 
officer detected the odor of burning marijuana coming from the passenger compa1tment of a 
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vehicle during a traffic stop. The officer then searched the entire vehicle. He found no 
marijuana but found precW'sors of methamphetamine production in the tnmk. After the driver 
was charged with a drug offense, he filed a suppression motion, contending that probable cause 
to search the trunk was lacking. The trial comt denied the motion. The question addressed in 
Schmadeka was the scope of the allowable search under the automobile exception when probable 
cause was based upon an odor of burnt marijuana coming from the passenger compartment. The 
pe1missible scope of a warrantless automobile search is defined by the object of the search and 
the places in which there is probable cause to believe it will be found. Ross, 456 U.S. at 824; 
Schmadeka, 136 Idaho at 598, 38 P.3d at 636. The existence of probable cause to search the 
interior of a car is not necessarily sufficient to justify a search of the car's trnnk. Schmadeka, 
136 Idaho at 599, 38 P.3d at 637. This Court joined the courts ofa number of other jurisdictions, 
holding that an officer's detection of an odor of burnt marijuana coming from the passenger 
compartment of a car provided probable cause to search the passenger compaitment but did not 
provide probable cause to search the car's trunk. Id at 599-600, 38 P.3d at 637-38. Our 
decision was predicated upon the commonsense distinction between the odor of burnt marijuana 
in the passenger compat1ment, which alone is not indicative of marijuana in the trunk, and an 
officer's detection of the odor of raw marijuana, which may justify a search of the entire vehicle. 
Id. at 600, 38 P.3d at 638; see also United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(distinction is premised on the commonsense proposition that it is unreasonable to believe people 
smoke marijuana in the tmnks of cars and the mere smell of burnt marijuana does not create the 
fair probability that the trunk contains marijuana). 
Here, the district court distinguished Schmadeka from this case. The result in Schmadeka 
stemmed from that the officer's determination that the marijuana he smelled had been bumed. 
The Schmadeka rationale was that marijuana is not likely to be smoked in a vehicle trunk, nor is 
burnt marijuana likely to be transported in a vehicle trunk. The same common sense reasoning 
does not hold true for a drug dog ale11, which communicates no distinction between burnt 
marijuana and raw marijuana or other dmgs to which the dog has been trained to alert. Here, no 
odors were detected by the officer. The record indicates that the drug dog alerted to the presence 
of a controlled substance odor. According to the drug dog's handling officer, the drug dog was 
trained to alert to the presence of multiple odors including marijuana, methamphetamine, heroin, 
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and cocaine. Regarding marijuana detection, the drug dog was trained to alert to the odor of both 
burnt and raw marijuana. Notably, the record shows that the rear seat was partially laid down, 
exposing the trunk compartment which would have allowed the air to flow to and from the trunk 
area. The handling officer testified that the drug dog alerted after sniffing the air through the 
open windows on the driver and passenger sides. Thus, unlike the officer's odor recognition in 
Schmadeka, the drug dog's alert on the vehicle's open front windows did not logically limit 
probable cause to the passenger compartment. Once the drug dog was placed in the vehicle, the 
dog immediately entered the backseat area and alerted to areas between and under the backseat 
cushions toward rear of the vehicle. The handling officer testified he believed this to mean that 
the odor was coming from the trunk or from behind the cushion. 
Although no prior case has directly addressed this issue, Idaho case law has not imposed 
limits on the area of a vehicle that is searchable based upon a drug dog alert. See State v. 
Anderson, 154 Idaho 703,706,302 P.Jd 328,331 (2012) (drug dog's alert on the exterior of a 
vehicle is sufficient, in and of itself, to establish probable cause for a warrantless search of the 
interior); State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 843, 979 P.2d 1199, 1201 (1999) (an officer's 
investigation at the scene of a stopped automobile can ripen into probable cause as soon as a 
drug detection dog alerts on the exterior of the vehicle, justifying a search of the vehicle without 
the necessity of obtaining a wal1'ant); Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 898, 821 P.2d at 953 (warrantless 
search of an automobile was proper when an officer's vehicle stop ripened into probable cause 
after a drug dog alerted on the rear exterior of the vehicle); State v. Buck, 155 Idaho 828, 829, 
317 P .3d 725, 726 (Ct. App. 2014) ( officer had probable cause to believe that there were drugs in 
the automobile and searched it without a warrant after a drug dog indicated to a controlled 
substance odor within an automobile); Gibson, 141 Idaho at 281, 108 P .3d at 428 ( officer had 
probable cause to believe that there were drugs in the automobile and conducted a warrantless 
search after a drug dog indicated that an automobile contained a controlled substance odor). 
Kelley has not demonstrated that the drug dog's alert provided probable cause to search only the 
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Kelley has failed to show that LC. § 49-808(2) is void for vagueness as applied to his 
conduct and therefore, the officer possessed reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. The 
officer further possessed reasonable suspicion to extend the dtll'ation of that stop to include 
additional investigative questions and drug dog search. Thus, there was probable cause to search 
the trunk. Therefore, the district court did not e1T in denying Kelley's motion to suppress 
evidence. Accordingly, Kelley's judgment of conviction for trafficking in marijuana is affirmed. 
Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge GRATTON, CONCUR. 
3 Additionally, Kelley predicates his argument on the chronology of the search. 
Specifically, he asse1ts that the trunk search was simultaneous with the drug dog's placement 
inside the vehicle. He contends that probable cause was not established at that time to justify a 
trunk search because there was nothing to indicate that there was an odor emanating from the 
trunk. As we have stated, we decline to limit searches to only the localized areas where a drug 
dog ale1ts. However, notwithstanding this holding, the record in this case belies Kelley's 
argument. Video evidence indicates that the two events, (the placement of the dog into the 
vehicle and the tnmk search) were not simultaneous and ,vere separated by approximately two 
minutes. Moreover, Kelley does not contest the district court's finding that, once inside the 
vehicle, the dog immediately entered the backseat and alerted to the seat back crevice and around 
the seat cushion at the floorboard nearest the rear of the vehicle. The video confirms that the dog 
was in the backseat tracing the detected odor before the trunk was opened. The handling officer 
testified that he believed that the drug dog was alerting to an odor in the trunk area or underneath 
the seat. Therefore, Kelley has failed to show that officers did not have probable cause at the 
time the trunk was searched. 
15 
